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NOTES 
 
U.S. VS. INTERNATIONAL STOCK 
OPTION DISCLOSURE REFORM: THE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY LEADS 
WHERE THE U.S. COMMUNITY FAILED 
“The point, ladies and gentlemen, 
is that greed, for lack of a better word, is good.”1 
Gordon Gekko2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
isclosure requirements for compensatory stock options 
were established in the United States (“U.S.”) in 1973.3  
At that time, companies granted stock options almost exclu-
sively to their corporate executives, and did so sparingly.4  How-
ever, since that time, corporations have expanded their use of 
compensatory stock options, which they now use as an employ-
ment compensation mechanism for many, if not all firm em-
  
 1. WALL STREET (20th Century Fox 1987). 
 2. Nefarious entrepreneur played by Michael Douglas in the movie WALL 
STREET.  Id.  Film critic, Roger Ebert, described director Oliver Stone’s film as, 
“a radical critique of the capitalist trading mentality,” and noted that Stone 
depicts small investors as dupes.  Roger Ebert, Wall Street, CHI. SUN-TIMES, 
Dec. 11, 1987, 33, available at http://www.suntimes.com/ebert/ebert_reviews/ 
1987/12/268135.html. 
 3. The Accounting Principles Board (“APB”) was established by the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants in 1959 as a successor to 
the Committee on Accounting Procedure, established in 1939, and as a pre-
cursor to the Federal Accounting Standards Bureau (“FASB”), established in 
1973.  Financial Accounting Standards, QuickMBA, at http://www.quickmba. 
com/accounting/fin/standards/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2003) [hereinafter Finan-
cial Accounting Standards].  The APB issued thirty-one opinions and four 
statements, which formed the basis of the FASB’s Generally Accepted Ac-
counting Principles (“GAAP”), the accounting standard followed in the U.S.  
Id. 
 4. Robert Dean Ellis, Equity Derivatives, Executive Compensation, and 
Agency Costs, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 399, at 412–13 (1998). 
D 
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ployees, and which account for an increasing percentage of each 
employee’s annual compensation package.5  This Note argues 
that U.S. accounting rules do not capture accurately corporate 
operating expenses on financial statements, thus, have failed to 
evolve accordingly. 
The U.S. accounting standard-setting body, the Federal Ac-
counting Standards Board (“FASB”), understood that its ac-
counting standard created a loophole which, almost without 
exception, every U.S. company used.6  Although a company was 
required to charge employment compensation as an expense on 
its balance sheet, reducing the amount of profit it reflected, a 
company could issue stock options as part of its employment 
compensation without recognizing a compensation expense on 
its financial statement.7  The FASB studied this disclosure 
loophole and drafted a revised procedure8 that, as this Note pos-
its in Part III.B., would have closed the option disclosure loop-
hole.  However, Congress, in order to cater to big business in-
terests, effectively overruled the FASB, and disclosure require-
ments remained largely unchanged.9 
Since that time, an international group of accounting regula-
tion agencies, which include the FASB, known as the Interna-
tional Accounting Standards Board (“IASB”), studied this dis-
closure issue.10  The IASB recognized the need for new disclo-
sure regulations and prepared its own preliminary standard,11 
which it made available to the public for comment through 
March 7, 2003.12  The IASB claims that its proposed standard 
  
 5. Id. 
 6. Robert W. Rouse & Douglas N. Barton, Stock Compensation Account-
ing, J. OF ACCOUNTANCY 67, 68 (June 1993). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. See Legislation Introduced to Overturn FASB Stock Option Proposal, J. 
OF ACCOUNTANCY 15, 16 (Oct. 1993) [hereinafter Lieberman Legislation]. 
 10. See supra Part IV.A. 
 11. IASC Chronology (1973–2001), International Accounting Standards 
Bureau, at para. 1, at http://www.iasc.org.uk/cmt/0001.asp?s=1400100&sc={A 
29ECA6C-5273428A-8D42-DF0E2776131A}&n=90 (last visited Sept. 23, 
2003). 
 12. Exposure Draft ED 2 Share-Based Payment, Int’l Accounting Standards 
Bd., at 5 (Nov. 2002), available at http://www.iasc.org.uk/docs/ed02/ed02.pdf. 
(last visited Sept. 23, 2003) [hereinafter IASB Exposure Draft].  See, e.g., 
AICPA, Letter to IASB Share Based Letter (Mar. 3, 2003), available at 
http://www.aicpa. org/members/div/acctstd/comltrs/ iasb_share.htm. 
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will provide investors with clearer disclosure than either the 
U.S. standard or other standards adopted internationally.13 
Part II of this Note explains how compensatory stock options 
function as corporate securities.  It then analyzes how and why 
companies issue compensatory stock options as part of execu-
tive compensation packages.  Part III first discusses the original 
U.S. stock option accounting standard and the rationale behind 
it.  Second, it examines the subsequent proposed changes to 
that standard, which ultimately were rejected.  Finally, it con-
siders the political melee that ensued, leading to the rejection of 
the FASB’s proposed changes, and discusses the standard that 
was adopted. 
Part IV sets forth the history of the international accounting 
standard-setting bodies, and then examines the international 
response to the stock option disclosure controversy.  This Part 
also outlines the international option disclosure regulation cur-
rently being considered.  Finally, Part V contends that compen-
satory stock options should be recognized as an expense on cor-
porate financial statements in order to improve disclosure.  It 
also advocates, among other things, that such a standard 
should be set by an international, rather than a national, stan-
dard-setting body. 
II. STOCK OPTIONS AS A CORPORATE SECURITY 
A stock option is a contract between the corporation and the 
holder (“grantee”) that awards the grantee the right to purchase 
a certain number of shares of the company’s underlying stock at 
a stated price per share (typically known as either the “exercise 
price” or “strike price” or “grant price”).14  This right usually 
  
 13. See Accounting for Share-Based Payment Project Summary, Int’l Ac-
counting Standards Committee Found., July 22, 2002, at para. 1, at http:// 
www.iasc.org.uk/cmt/0001.asp?s=1406384&sc={3F02305A-2976-47E1-866A-
7FA492B49D31}&n=3318 (last visited Sept. 23, 2003) [hereinafter IASB 
Summary]. 
 14. Max J. Schwartz, PLI Tax Law and Estate Planning Course Handbook 
Series, A Primer on Stock-Based Compensation and Selected Recent Develop-
ments, 537 PLI/TAX 9, 14 (2002); Eric L. Johnson, Waste Not, Want Not: An 
Analysis of Stock Option Plans, Executive Compensation, and the Proper 
Standard of Waste, 26 J. CORP. L. 145, at 146–48 (2002).  See James M. Scan-
nella, Payments in Cancellation of Stock Options, THE CPA J. ONLINE, July 
1989, at para. 1, at http://www.nyscpa.org/cpajournal/old/07688672.htm (last 
visited Nov. 7, 2002). 
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vests over time, making the option exercisable at a future date.15  
Both the exercise price and the underlying number of shares 
granted can be determined either at the date of grant (“grant 
date”) or at some point after the grant date.16  The grantee, in 
turn, can exercise her option to purchase shares of the underly-
ing stock at some point after the option vests or partially vests 
and before it expires.17  The grantee, likely, will choose to exer-
cise her option when the price per share of the underlying stock 
exceeds the option’s exercise price, at which point she either 
may retain the stock or sell it and realize a cash profit.18 
  
 15. Schwartz, supra note 14, at 14. 
 16. Id. 
 17. There are three basic exercise methods: (1) cash exercise, in which the 
grantee pays the exercise price, together with the requisite transactional fees 
and withholding taxes; (2) cashless exercise, in which the grantee uses a por-
tion of her options to purchase shares of stock, which the grantee simultane-
ously sells to pay the transaction fees, exercise cost and withholding taxes (if 
any) and (3) swap, in which the grantee uses company stock that she already 
owns to cover the exercise cost, and the grantee will pay transaction fees and 
withholding taxes, if applicable.  The company provides for its exercise 
method(s) in its stock option plan.  Stock Option Basics, Charles Schwab, at 
http://www.schwab.com/SchwabNOW/SNLibrary/SNLib123/SN123Article/0,56
37,872%7C4816,00.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2003).  Additionally, a rela-
tively new exercise method, the “West Coast Option” or “Reverse Vesting Op-
tion,” allows the grantee to exercise unvested options and receive it’s underly-
ing stock, subject to a repurchase right by the company, which right will lapse 
according to the option’s vesting schedule.  Pamela B. Greene, Memorandum 
Regarding Early Exercise of Unvested Options, 1 (Jan. 31, 2002) (unpublished 
corporate form document produced by Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky 
and Popeo, P.C.) (on file with author). 
 18. In deciding whether to exercise a stock option, the grantee should take 
account of several personal investment and tax considerations, including im-
pact on capital gains taxes and on estate taxes.  Sonja Lepkowski, Compensa-
tory Stock Options, THE CPA J., Sept. 2000, at sub-heading When to Exercise 
Options et. seq., at http://www.luca.com/cpajoural/2000/0900/dept/d95600a. 
htm.  When the market price of the underlying stock is below the exercise 
price, the option is deemed “under water.”  Bottom Line: Treat Options as an 
Expense, MERCURY NEWS, May 30, 2002, at Definitions, at http://www.bay 
area.com/mld/mercurynews/news/opinion/3364740.htm [hereinafter Bottom 
Line].  Although under water options typically are not exercisable (because 
the grantee could purchase the same number of shares on the open market for 
less than the grantee’s exercise price), the under water options still have value 
because the stock price can rebound before the option expires.  Id.  When an 
option’s exercise price equals the market price of the underlying stock, the 
option is deemed “at the money.”  At the money, Investorwords.com, at 
http://www.investorwords.com/cgi-bin/getword.cgi?319 (last visited Sept. 23, 
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Compensatory stock options are stock options granted to em-
ployees and consultants in payment of services rendered to the 
issuing company.19  Typically, companies issue them as part of 
an employment compensation package.20  Moreover, compensa-
tory stock options usually are issued subject to a plan that has 
been adopted by the issuing company’s board of directors and 
stockholders.21  The plan sets forth the purposes, parameters 
and requirements of the company’s compensatory stock pro-
gram.22 
There are two types of compensatory stock options: the first is 
a statutory or “incentive” stock option (“ISO”), and the second is 
a non-statutory or “nonqualified” stock option (“NSO”).23  Both 
are so named to signify their respective tax treatment under the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (“Code”).24  As one 
author notes, “[t]he basic distinctions between these two types 
of options are how the gain from the option is taxed and what 
formal requirements the options must have.  Generally, while 
the incentive stock option is more tax-favored, the nonqualified 
stock option is more flexible.”25 
  
2003).  When the market price exceeds the exercise price, the option is deemed 
“in the money.”  In the money, Investorwords.com, at http://www. Investor 
words.com/cgibin/getword.cgi?2580&in%20the%20money (last visited Sept. 
23, 2003). 
 19. Scannella, supra note 14. 
 20. Whitney Tilson, The Stock Option Travesty, THE MOTLEY FOOL, Mar. 
20, 2002, at para 2, at http://www.fool.com/Server/FoolPrint.asp?File=/news/ 
foth/2002/foth020320. htm. 
 21. Marc H. Folladori, Disclosures Regarding Executive Officer and Direc-
tor Compensation and Shareholder Approval of Compensation Plans, 1285 
PLI/CORP 211, at 254 (2002). 
 22. See, e.g., Amazon.com, Inc. 1997 Stock Option Plan, Findlaw Corporate 
Counsel Center, Findlaw.com, available at http://contracts.corporate.find 
law.com/agreements/amzon/stockoption.1997.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2003). 
 23. Schwartz, supra note 14, at 15. 
 24. Id.  The tax treatment in the Code refers to that of the grantee.  Gen-
erally, ISO’s have a more favorable tax treatment under the Code than NSOs.  
NSOs are regulated by § 83 of the Code and ISOs are regulated by § 421 and 
§ 422 of the Code.  Id.  For more information regarding tax treatment of stock 
options and other stock-based executive compensation, see id. at 15–24.  See 
Scott P. Spector, Significant Issues Relating to Stock-Based Compensation for 
Executives, 503 PLI/TAX 745 (2001). 
 25. Johnson, supra note 14, at 147. 
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A. Two Types of Compensatory Stock Options: ISOs and NSOs 
ISOs were created by Congress as an instrument through 
which companies could attract and retain qualified personnel, 
particularly senior management.26  The “incentive” in the ISO 
refers to a tax incentive provided in the Code to the grantee.27  
For a stock option to be deemed an ISO, it must meet several 
requirements set forth in the Code.28  First, an ISO must be 
granted pursuant to an incentive stock plan, which must be ap-
proved by the company’s stockholders within twelve months of 
the plan’s adoption by the Board of Directors.29  An ISO can be 
granted only to an employee of the company issuing the option, 
and the employee cannot transfer the ISO to a third party.30  
Further, the option’s exercise price must equal or exceed the 
fair market value of the underlying stock on the grant date, and 
it “must be exercisable within ten years” of the grant date.31  
Finally, as of the grant date, the employee must own less than 
10% of the company’s voting stock.32 
  
 26. Id. 
The legislative history of section 422 [of the Code] states that the re-
tention of employees was one of Congress’ purposes in creating the 
ISO.  Further evidence of Congress’ intent is the requirement that 
the person exercising the option must be an employee of the employer 
granting the option “at all times during the period beginning on the 
date of the granting of the option and ending on the day [three] 
months before the date of such exercise.”  This provision works in 
tandem with another section 422 requirement – – if the employee ex-
ercises the option within two years of the granting, then she will no 
longer qualify for the favored tax treatment.  Therefore, the employee 
would want to remain employed at least two years by the corporation, 
so that any gain from the exercise she receives will not be taxed as 
income. 
Id. at 149. 
 27. Id. at 147. 
 28. Robert W. Wood, Executive Compensation, Stock Options and Golden 
Parachutes, SG016 ALI-ABA 957, 960–961 (2001). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id.  If at the time of the grant, the grantee owns more than 10% “of the 
total combined voting power of all classes of stock” of the issuing company, or 
one of its parents, subsidiaries or affiliates, as defined in § 424 of the Code, 
the option’s grant price must equal at least 110% of the fair market value per 
share as of the grant date. Anne Bruno & Pamela B. Greene, Plan Description 
for Employee, Director and Consultant Stock Option Plan, 5 (Nov. 30, 2001) 
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The “incentive” supplied in the Code refers to the fact that an 
ISO grant can provide the grantee with better tax treatment 
than an NSO grant.33  Under an ISO grant, the grantee is not 
taxed when she exercises her option, but when she disposes of 
the option’s underlying stock.34  Therefore, the grantee will not 
be forced to pay the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) for the 
income received until she actually realizes a cash profit from 
the stock sale.35  Additionally, the ISO holder may qualify to 
receive preferential capital gains tax treatment.36  However, to 
reap this tax benefit, the ISO grantee must hold the option for 
two years prior to exercising it.37  Additionally, the grantee then 
must hold the underlying stock for at least one year before sell-
ing it.38 
Unlike an ISO, an NSO is not subject to such rigorous statu-
tory requirements, and thus, provides the company with greater 
flexibility.39  Companies can grant NSOs to employees, consult-
ants and others without being restricted by the option’s condi-
tions or expiration date, at an option price above or below the 
fair market value of the underlying stock.40  Under an NSO 
grant, the grantee is taxed when she exercises her option.41  Al-
though the purpose of an ISO is to provide the grantee prefer-
  
(unpublished corporate form document produced by Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Fer-
ris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C.) (on file with author).  For all of the requirements 
to be deemed an ISO, see I.R.C. § 422. 
 33. Schwartz, supra note 14, at 15–17. 
 34. Id. at 16. 
 35. See generally id. at 20–21. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Bruno & Greene, supra note 32, at 14. 
 38. Id.  Pursuant to the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, under an ISO grant, 
the grantee will receive beneficial (long-term capital gains) tax treatment if 
she holds the underlying stock for more than twelve months after she exer-
cises her option.  Otherwise, the grantee will be taxed at the same rate as an 
NSO grantee.  Schwartz, supra note 14, at 16. 
 39. Schwartz, supra note 14, at 16–20; Johnson, supra note 14, at 147–48. 
 40. Wood, supra note 28, at 959. 
 41. Schwartz, supra note 14, at 16.  The grantee must pay income tax on 
the increased value of the option, which is the difference between the value of 
the shares at exercise and the option’s exercise price. Interestingly, the issu-
ing company can take a tax deduction on the same amount that the employee 
is taxed.  Bruno & Greene, supra note 32, at 14–15.  Such compensation in-
come of grantees may be subject to withholding taxes, and a deduction may 
then be allowable to the company in an amount equal to the grantee’s com-
pensation income.  Id. 
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ential tax treatment, due to the ISO’s holding requirements, 
most ISO grantees never actually receive its tax benefit.42  Thus, 
the benefit of an ISO grant to its employees is often a perceived 
tax benefit, rather than an actual tax benefit. 
B. Stock Option Rationale: Why Companies Issue Them as Ex-
ecutive Compensation 
Granting stock options as part of an executive compensation 
package became increasingly popular in the 1990s during the 
explosion of high technology start-up companies.43  By the late 
1990s, “more than eighty percent of the largest [U.S.] compa-
nies use[d] equity-based compensation to link executives to 
long-term corporate performance.  The long-term variable com-
ponent of such pay comprise[d] sixty percent of the typical 
CEO’s gross annual compensation.”44  The theoretical rationale 
for this phenomenon is fourfold. 
First, agency theorists argue that by linking a significant 
percentage of an executive’s compensation to the price per share 
of the of the company’s stock, “it will encourage the executive to 
increase the firm’s profitability to achieve higher stock prices.”45  
Thus, the executive will gain or lose personally, along with the 
stockholders.46 
Second, this link also aligns executives’ willingness to take 
risks with that of the company’s stockholders.47  Corporate ex-
ecutives are typically risk-averse.48  However, if a CEO’s finan-
cial success is tied to that of her company, she will be more 
likely to take greater risks so that her decisions will make 
  
 42. See id. 
 43. See Roberta S. Karmel, Securities Regulation the Fuss Over Stock Op-
tions, N.Y. L.J. 3 (June 20, 2002).  “Equity-based compensation, and particu-
larly stock options, helped to fuel the stock market bubble of the 1990s.  Cor-
porate executives were motivated to focus on stock market prices rather than 
long-term profitability.”  Id. 
 44. See Ellis, supra note 4, at 412–13. 
 45. Johnson, supra note 14, at 148.  See Ellis, supra note 4, at 405.  For a 
discussion on the Agency-Cost Model, see Johnson, supra note 14, at 405–17. 
 46. Johnson, supra note 14, at 148.  For a discussion of this insight from 
the Agency-Cost Model and its potential shortcomings in describing actual 
practice, see Ellis, supra note 4, at 405–17. 
 47. See Johnson, supra note 14, at 148–49. 
 48. Id. 
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higher gains for the company’s stockholders, and for herself, 
under a “nothing ventured, nothing gained” philosophy.49 
Third, companies grant stock options to retain management.50  
By establishing both a vesting period (typically over a number 
of years) and a requirement that the employee remain employed 
by the company in order to exercise her stock options, the com-
pany encourages the employee to be invested in her job.51  As a 
corporate retention policy, the employee will weigh the addi-
tional cost of losing her unvested options before deciding to 
leave her job.52 
Finally, companies grant stock options as an inexpensive, yet 
effective incentive to attract talented management whom, par-
ticularly at start-up companies, they could not afford to com-
pensate in cash.53  Although start-up companies rarely have suf-
ficient capital to attract qualified management with cash com-
pensation, stock options can create potentially lucrative com-
pensation packages due to the high growth potential of high-
technology, start-up companies.54 
III. HISTORY OF U.S. ACCOUNTING PROCEDURE 
A. Opinion No. 25, Accounting for Stock Issued to Employees 
Although under accounting rules, including the GAAP,55 em-
ployee compensation is treated as a corporate expense,56 Ac-
counting Principles Board Opinion No. 25, Accounting for Stock 
Issued to Employees (“Opinion No. 25”)57 carves out “a rather 
broad exemption from compensation accounting for certain 
broad-based plans.”58  Opinion No. 25 sets forth regulations and 
  
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 149.  See Christine I. Wiedman & Daniel J. Goldberg, Accounting 
for Stock-Based Compensation: As Easy as SFAS 123?, IVEY BUS. J., July/Aug. 
2001, 6, at 6–9. 
 51. Johnson, supra note 14, at 149. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 149–50.  See Wiedman and Goldberg, supra note 50. 
 54. Johnson, supra note 14, at 149–50. 
 55. For a definition of GAAP, see supra note 3. 
 56. See generally Rouse & Barton, supra note 6. 
 57. Financial Accounting Standards, supra note 3. 
 58. Summary of Recent Accounting Literature Interpreting APB Opinion 
No. 25, Accounting for Stock Issued to Employees, Ernst & Young, para. 13, at 
http://www.ey.com/global/Content.nsf/US/AABS_-_Assurance__Articles__Inter 
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accounting procedures for stock-based compensation given to 
employees.59  Specifically, if a company adopts a broad-based 
employee stock option plan that meets certain requirements set 
forth in the Code, the company can avoid recognizing a compen-
sation expense in its financial statement when it grants options 
to its employees under that plan, even though it must recognize 
such an expense for its employees’ salaries.60  The rationale be-
hind this carve-out is that although, technically, all employee 
stock option grants compensate employee grantees, the grant-
ing company adopts its compensatory stock plan to increase its 
capital account (by paying less cash compensation to its em-
ployees in salaries and bonuses), to promote employee owner-
ship of the company, or to align employee and corporate inter-
ests (by linking the employee’s compensation to the company’s 
long-term financial success).61 
When applying Opinion No. 25, the “compensation cost” or 
“expense” of a stock option is measured by its intrinsic value, 
which is the difference between a stock’s market price and its 
exercise price on the measurement date.62  The measurement 
date, “is the first date on which both (1) the number of shares 
that an individual employee is entitled to receive and 
(2) the...[exercise] price, if any, are known.”63  Moreover, the 
plan’s expense “generally is recognized over the equity award’s 
vesting period.  Compensation [cost or] expense associated with 
  
preting_APB_Opinion_No_25 (last visited Sept. 23, 2003) [hereinafter Ernst & 
Young Summary].  For an list of criteria, see id. at paras. 14–17. 
 59. See generally Terry Grant & Conrad S. Ciccotello, The Stock Options 
Accounting Subterfuge, STRATEGIC FIN. MAG., Apr. 2002, at 37, 41 [hereinafter, 
Subterfuge]. 
 60. Id. at para. 13.  For a list of criteria, see id. at paras. 14–17.  Compen-
satory stock options affect corporate financial statements in 3 ways: (1) as 
options are exercised, the number of shares issued and outstanding increases, 
diluting the per share price; (2) the cash payment of the exercise price to the 
company generally is reflected in the annual report under the section entitled 
“Cash Flows from Financing Activities;” and (3) the company receives a tax 
deduction upon each exercise of a compensatory stock option.  Tilson, supra 
note 20, at para. 2. 
 61. Ernst & Young Summary, supra note 58, at para. 13. 
 62. Conrad S. Ciccotello & C. Terry Grant, Employee Stock Option Account-
ing Changes, J. OF ACCOUNTANCY, Jan. 1995, at 72 [hereinafter Accounting 
Changes]. 
 63. Ernst & Young Summary, supra note 58, at para. 18. 
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awards that immediately are vested or attributable to past ser-
vices is recognized when granted.”64 
From 1972 until 1993, Opinion No. 25 governed disclosure of 
compensatory stock options in profit and loss statements.65  
Among other things, Opinion No. 25 provided that a stock op-
tion plan could be categorized either as compensatory or non-
compensatory.66  Under a compensatory plan, the company can 
grant either a fixed or variable award.67 
A stock option grant is fixed if both the number of underlying 
shares an employee can purchase and the exercise price are de-
termined at the grant date.68  Under a fixed grant, because the 
employee’s equity-based compensation is pre-determined, so 
long as her option continues to vest (i.e. as long as the grantee 
keeps her job), she will be able to exercise her stock option re-
gardless of her actual employment performance.69  Assuming 
the company’s stock increases in value from the grant date, the 
employee will be able to exercise her option and realize a 
profit.70 
Conversely, a stock option grant is variable if either the num-
ber of underlying shares an employee can purchase or the exer-
cise price is determinable only after the grant date.71  For exam-
ple, under a variable stock option grant, the number of shares 
granted to an employee could be contingent on realizing a per-
formance target (such as going public, achieving a certain level 
of efficiency or improving a certain technology) or the stock 
market price maintaining a certain price per share.72  Because a 
variable grant can be tailored to the accomplishment of a spe-
cific employee, it is commonly known as a “performance-based” 
option grant.73 
When the grant’s measurement date and grant date occur si-
multaneously, the compensation cost is determinable or “fixed” 
  
 64. Id. 
 65. Financial Accounting Standards, supra note 3. 
 66. Ernst & Young Summary, supra note 58, at para. 11. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Rouse & Barton, supra note 6, at 68.  Ernst & Young Summary, supra 
note 58, at para. 1. 
 69. Lepkowski, supra note 18, at sub-heading Incentive Stock Options. 
 70. See id. 
 71. Rouse & Barton, supra note 6, at 68. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Accounting Changes, supra note 62, at 72. 
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at the grant date, and thus, the issuance is a fixed stock option 
grant.74  Therefore, when a company grants a fixed stock option 
at an exercise price that is equal to the market price of the un-
derlying stock on the grant date, the company does not recog-
nize any compensation expense on its financial statement.75  
However, when a company grants a variable stock option, it 
must estimate and accrue the option’s expense from the period 
between the grant date and the ultimate measurement date.76 
Due to the tax implications of Opinion No. 25, fixed option 
grants are more favorable than variable grants because fixed 
grant compensatory stock options have no intrinsic value when 
granted.  Thus, the company incurs no expense.77  Furthermore, 
although a variable option grant can be exercised only if the 
stated target is met, making it less valuable to the grantee than 
a fixed option grant, the variable grant is more expensive for 
the issuing company than the fixed grant because the variable 
grant likely will cause a compensation expense to be charged to 
the company.78  As commentators Rouse and Barton point out, 
the preferred tax treatment given to the fixed option grant 
“seems counterintuitive.”79  Accordingly, the FASB began study-
ing stock compensation in an effort to resolve these discrepan-
cies.80 
B. SFAS 123 Accounting for Stock-Based Compensation 
1. The Draft Proposal 
Opinion No. 25 inadvertently encouraged companies to issue 
fixed compensatory stock options with an exercise price equal to 
the market price on the grant date, thereby intentionally creat-
ing a grant with no intrinsic value.81  After years of debate over 
the growing need for clarity or “transparency” of compensatory 
stock options on financial statements, and in light of the in-
creased use of fixed stock options as compensation for senior 
  
 74. Id. at para. 19; Rouse & Barton, supra note 6, at 68. 
 75. Ernst & Young Summary, supra note 58, at para. 20. 
 76. Accounting Changes, supra note 62, at 72. 
 77. Rouse & Barton, supra note 6, at 68. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
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executives, the FASB reversed its opinion on the compensatory 
stock option carve-out for employees and directors.82  The FASB 
stated publicly that all compensatory stock option grants should 
be accounted for as an expense to the issuing company.83  In 
reaching this conclusion, the FASB recognized that because 
compensatory stock options were being used regularly as a sig-
nificant percentage of senior executives’ compensation pack-
ages, increased corporate disclosure was needed to provide in-
vestors with the requisite information to make sound invest-
ment decisions.84 
In 1993, the FASB issued its Exposure Draft of SFAS 123 Ac-
counting for Stock-Based Compensation (“FASB Exposure 
Draft”) to close the loophole created by Opinion No. 25.85  The 
FASB Exposure Draft required companies to recognize all 
grants of compensatory stock options as expenses in their in-
come statements.86  Moreover, the FASB Exposure Draft re-
quired the expense to be measured using the fair value of the 
option’s underlying stock at the grant date, instead of its intrin-
sic value as required by Opinion No. 25.87  The FASB adopted 
the fair value method because, although the intrinsic value 
method would be much easier to calculate, it believed that fair 
value better represented an option’s true value.  Under the fair 
value method, 
compensation cost is measured at the grant date and is recog-
nized over the service period (typically the vesting period).  
  
 82. Alan Levinsohn, Stock-Option Accounting Battle Resumes After Seven-
Year Détente, STRATEGIC FIN., June 2002, at 63. 
 83. Id.  The FASB based its opinion on the fact that compensatory stock 
options are issued to employees as compensation for services rendered to the 
company.  Id.  Christine A. Botosan and Marlene A. Plumlee, in their study on 
the effects of stock option expense, studied one hundred companies named by 
Fortune Magazine as “America’s Fastest-Growing Companies” and found that: 
(1) for a majority of its sample companies, the impact of stock option expense 
is material; (2) within the next three to five years, stock option expense would 
“become even more economically significant” and (3) there is a segment of the 
corporate population that currently is not in compliance with SFAS 123.  
Christine A. Botosan & Marlene A. Plumlee, Stock Option Expense: The 
Sword of Damocles Revealed, ACCOUNTING HORIZONS, Dec. 2001, at 312, 325. 
 84. Rouse & Barton, supra note 6, at 68. 
 85. Subterfuge, supra note 59, at 41. 
 86. Id. 
 87. FASB Issues Proposal on Stock Option Compensation, J. OF 
ACCOUNTANCY, Sept. 1993, at 23. 
File: EllenMacro3.doc Created on:  10/21/2003 11:06 AM Last Printed: 11/16/2003 9:27 PM 
294 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 29:1 
Fair value is determined using an option pricing model (such 
as Black-Scholes or a binomial pricing mode) that takes into 
account the grant date, the exercise price, the expected life of 
the option, the current price of the underlying stock, its ex-
pected volatility, expected dividends on the stock, and the risk-
free interest rate over the expected life of the option.88 
By requiring companies to use the fair value method instead 
of the intrinsic value method, the FASB Exposure Draft re-
quired companies to capture on the income statements the in-
crease in value that option grantees would recognize over their 
option’s vesting period.89 
2. The Proposal as Adopted 
Public response to the FASB Exposure Draft was unambigu-
ous and overwhelmingly negative.90  The U.S. business commu-
  
 88. Wiedman & Goldberg, supra note 50, at 6.  Additionally, under the 
GAAP, “most exchange transactions” are stated based on the clearer of the 
fair value of the consideration given or of the item received.  However, Opin-
ion No. 25 used the intrinsic value method instead of fair value because it was 
generally accepted that the underlying stock value was too difficult or tenuous 
to calculate.  Rouse & Barton, supra note 6, at 69.  For a description and 
analysis of the binomial pricing mode, see Stefan Winter, Tax and accounting 
implications of sequential stock options grants, Research Report 2001–1, Uni-
versity of Wuerzburg, Faculty of Business and Economics, Chair of Business 
Administration, Personnel, and Organization, at 7–8 (Mar. 2001).  An option 
pricing model is a mathematical formula used to determine the theoretical 
fair value of an option.  Option Pricing Models, at sub-heading Option pricing 
models, Australian Stock Exchange, at http://www.asx.com.au/markets/l4/ 
PricingModels_AM4.shtm (last visited Sept. 23, 2003).  The two most widely 
used option pricing models are the Black-Scholes option pricing model and the 
binomial option pricing model.  The binomial pricing model was developed by 
Cox, Ross and Rubinstein and published in 1979.  Id. at The binomial pricing 
model.  For a summary of the binomial model, see id.  The Black-Scholes for-
mula was develop by economists Fischer Black and Myron Scholes in 1973.  In 
1997, Black, who had died in 1995, and Scholes were awarded the Nobel Price 
in Economics for their options-pricing model.  Bottom Line, supra note 18.  For 
a description of both of the Black-Scholes Pricing Model and Binomial Model, 
see Option Pricing Models and the “Greeks”, Peter Hoadley’s Options Strategy 
Analysis Tools, at http://www.hoadley.net/options/BS.htm#Binomial (last vis-
ited Sept. 23, 2003). 
 89. Rouse & Barton, supra note 6, at 69. 
 90. Botosan & Plumlee, supra note 83, at 313. For example, Thomas M. 
Foster, Vice President and Controller of Phelps-Dodge Corp. said, “Like most 
accountants, I think the FASB’s efforts are a waste of time.  It shouldn’t try to 
develop noncash charges that essentially don’t provide financial statement 
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nity came out in force to renounce the FASB Exposure Draft as 
detrimental to industry and to the economy for the same reason 
that the FASB saw the need to act: expensing compensatory 
stock options could reduce the profit reflected on a company’s 
financial statement by a significant percentage and, in turn, 
force a change in the manner and degree of compensation to 
employees and senior executives.91 
Opposition to the FASB Exposure Draft was threefold.  Com-
panies argued that the new measure was extremely subjective,92 
accountants argued that the theories behind the technical 
changes were too difficult to comprehend,93 and both agreed that 
the FASB Exposure Draft would have an adverse impact on 
small, start-up companies.94  In one prominent complaint, the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (“AICPA”) 
  
users with any useful information.”  Lieberman Legislation, supra note 9, at 
16.  The FASB received over one thousand, seven hundred comment letters on 
the FASB Exposure Draft, many of them before the draft was released to the 
public.  Botosan & Plumlee, supra note 83. 
 91. Rouse & Barton, supra note 6, at 70.  For example, had America 
Online, Inc. applied the FASB Exposure Draft rules in 1992, it would have 
reduced AOL’s earnings of 40 cents per share by at least 25%.  Roula Khalif, If 
It Ain’t Broke…, FORBES, Apr. 12, 1993, at 100.  Had the FASB Exposure 
Draft measure been applied in 2000, Cisco Systems, Inc.’s earnings would 
have been reduced by 40% and WorldCom, Inc.’s earnings would have been 
reduced by 14%.  Geoffrey Colvin, Losing the Good Fight, FORTUNE, Apr. 15, 
2002, at 75.  Colvin also points out that Cisco’s per share price is down 79%, 
and WorldCom’s per share price is down 84%, after which he asks whether 
reporting lower earnings “would have been a bad thing.”  Id.  In 2001, applica-
tion of the FASB Exposure Draft would have reduced the Standard & Poor’s 
500-stock index earnings-per-share in excess of 24%.  Duncan Hughes, Now 
the Fed Enters Standards Battle, ACCOUNTANCYAGE.COM, July 25, 2002, para. 
10, at http://www.acountancyage.com/ Analysis/1130141. 
 92. Khalif, supra note 91. 
 93. Rouse & Barton, supra note 6, at 70.  “Opponents to recognition of 
stock-based compensation expense also believe that the value of employee 
stock options cannot be measured reliably because existing option value esti-
mation technology is not suitable for employee options, which have unique 
characteristics, and estimation of option values requires exercise of substan-
tial management discretion.”  David Aboody, Mary E. Barth and Ron Kasznik, 
SFAS 123 Stock-Based Compensation Expense and Equity Market Values, 
July 2001, at 2. 
 94. Accounting Changes, supra note 62, at 73–77.  For an example and 
analysis on how the FASB Exposure Draft would affect small versus large 
companies, see id. at 37–39.  See also Lyn Perlmuth, Hanging Tough on Stock 
Options, INSTITUT’L INVESTOR, Nov. 1994, at 172. 
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submitted a public response letter to the FASB Exposure Draft 
claiming, among other things, that the amended disclosure poli-
cies would not provide any additional transparency to the in-
vesting public and that the disclosure policy provided for in 
Opinion No. 25 continued to produce reliable results.95 
 Furthermore, in response to the public outcry from individu-
als and organizations lobbying for business interests, both the 
U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives entered the de-
bate.  Several members of Congress supported a “Sense of Con-
gress Resolution” against the FASB Exposure Draft.96  Addi-
tionally, Senator Joseph Lieberman of Connecticut introduced 
S. 1175, the Equity Expansion Act of 1993,97 a bill that would 
require the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) to 
overrule the FASB Exposure Draft, effectively revoking the 
FASB’s rule-making authority.98  Although S. 1175 never came 
to a vote on the Senate floor,99 the bill had sufficient support to 
pass.100 
  
 95. AsSEC Comments on FASB’s Stock Option Proposal, J. OF 
ACCOUNTANCY, Mar. 1994, 9.  Walter Schueltze, then the SEC’s chief account-
ant, in his address to the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(“AICPA”), noted that initially, most major accounting firms backed expensing 
stock options, and that he found the recent reversal troubling.  Schueltze 
pointed out that the change of heart, “left members of the public with the im-
pression [that] the switch was in response to a fear of losing clients or other 
forms of retaliation.”  Schultze Wary over CPA Independence on Stock Option 
Proposal, J. OF ACCOUNTANCY, Mar. 1994, 9. 
 96. Grace Hinchman, Fasten Seat Belts: Bumpy Ride for Stock Option Ac-
counting, FIN. EXECUTIVE, Sept. 2001, at 68, available at http://www.fei.org/ 
magazine/articles/9 2001_washington.cfm.  The resolution was introduced by 
Representative Anna Eshoo of California and former Senator Bill Bradley of 
New Jersey.  Id.  A “Sense of Congress Resolution” merely articulates Con-
gress’ opinion, but has no statutory authority.  Id. 
 97. Equity Expansion Act of 1993, S. 1175, 103d Cong. (1993). 
 98. Lieberman Legislation, supra note 9, at 15.  Lieberman argued that the 
FASB Exposure Draft, if adopted, would be detrimental as a matter of public 
policy.  Id.  Lieberman was joined by members of both political parties in con-
demning the FASB Exposure Draft and promoting S. 1175.  Id. 
 99. The bill never came to a vote because the FASB caved into political 
pressure and revised the FASB Exposure Draft to remove the expensing re-
quirement.  See Hinchman, supra note 96. 
 100. Id.  More than 60 Senators supported S. 1175.  Id.  Representative 
Nancy Johnson of Connecticut and Representative Lewis Payne of Virginia 
submitted H.R. 2759, a companion bill to S. 1175.  Lieberman Legislation, 
supra note 9, at 15. 
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However, a small but distinguished minority supported, and 
continue to support, the principles set forth in the FASB Expo-
sure Draft.  During the initial controversy, Senator Carl Levin 
of Michigan and Representative John Bryant of Texas vocally 
opposed S. 1175.101  Additionally, as far back as 1985, Warren 
Buffet, CEO and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Berk-
shire Hathaway Inc.,102 made clear his position that compensa-
tory stock options should be expensed.103  He explained that, 
among other things, “it is both silly and cynical to say that an 
important item of cost should not be recognized simply because 
it can’t be quantified with pinpoint precision.”104 
  
 101. Senator Carl Levin and Representative John Bryant sent a letter to 
their fellow members of Congress urging them to support the FASB Exposure 
Draft.  Their letter said, “[i]t is time to bring stock options under the rules of 
ordinary compensation.”  Lieberman Legislation, supra note 9, at 15–16.  
Senator Levin also stated that “[compensatory] stock options are the only kind 
of compensation that companies can deduct from their taxes as an expense but 
don’t have to include in their books as an expense.”  Perlmuth, supra note 94. 
 102. Berkshire Hathaway Inc. is an Omaha-based holding company with 
more than $2 billion in holdings and owns thirty-six subsidiaries, including 
property and casualty insurance and reinsurance businesses like GEICO Cor-
poration and General Re Corporation, and other businesses as diverse as Ben-
jamin Moore and Dairy Queen.  BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC., 2001 ANNUAL 
REPORT, Inside Cover, 72, available at http://www.berkshirehatway.com/2001 
ar/2001ar.pdf.  The company also maintains significant holdings (approxi-
mately 10%) in several multinational corporations, including American Ex-
press Company, The CocaCola Company, The Gillette Company, H&R Block, 
Inc., Moody’s Corporation, The Washington Post and Wells Fargo and Com-
pany, as well as other insurance and reinsurance companies.  Id. at Inside 
Cover.  Warren Buffet took over Berkshire Hathaway in 1965.  At that time, 
stock was trading at $18 per share.  Today, Berkshire Hathaway stock trades 
at more than $70,000 per share.  John Price, The Return of the Buffetteers, 
Warren Buffet Meets Sherlock Homes, reprinted with permission from 
INVESTOR J., (Aug. 1998), available at http://www.sherlockinvesting.com/art 
icles/buffetteers.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2003). 
 103. 1985 Annual Letter from Warren E. Buffet to the shareholders of Berk-
shire Hathaway Inc. (Mar. 4, 1986), at http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/ 
letters/1985.html. 
 104. 1992 Annual Letter from Warren E. Buffet to the shareholders of Berk-
shire Hathaway Inc. (Mar. 1, 1993), at http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/let 
ters/1992.html [hereinafter 1992 Annual Letter].  In his 1992 annual letter, 
Buffet, addressing Berkshire Hathaway’s stockholders, stated, 
It seems to me that the realities of stock options can be summarized 
quite simply: If options aren’t a form of compensation, what are they?  
If compensation isn’t an expense, what is it?  And, if expenses 
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The FASB claimed to be beyond the sway of political pres-
sure,105 yet it appears that in fear of losing its autonomy and 
authority, the FASB succumbed to it, nonetheless.106  When 
SFAS 123 was adopted in October 1995107 in its final form, it did 
not require companies to recognize options as expenses in their 
financial statements.  Instead, it permitted companies to choose 
between recognition of options as an expense on financial 
statements and disclosure of such options in footnotes.108  More-
over, SFAS 123 does not require calculation and disclosure of 
“the annual charge for stock option expense”109 by using “the 
total fair value of options granted during the year.  Instead, 
firms amortize the total fair value over the period(s) in which 
the related services are rendered.”110 
  
shouldn’t go into the calculation of earnings, where in the world 
should they go? 
Id. 
 105. Diana Willis, FASB Project Manager, stated that although the FASB 
would take the controversy into account, “[p]olitics is not a factor in the 
board’s deliberations.”  Perlmuth, supra note 94.  But see Hinchman, supra 
note 96 (noting that Dennis Beresford, former Chairman of the FASB, admit-
ted that the FASB’s decision not to require companies to expense compensa-
tory stock options was heavily influenced by it’s fear of congressional inter-
vention).  James Lensing, former Vice Chairman of the FASB, stated that the 
FASB had not changed its opinion of the need for companies to expense com-
pensatory stock options, but the FASB’s concern over being overruled by Con-
gress forced the FASB to abandon its policy.  Id. 
 106. Botosan & Plumlee, supra note 83. 
 107. Haksu Kim, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 123, Pacific 
Inv. Research, Inc., at http://www.fawpir.com/standard/sfas123.htm (last vis-
ited Sept. 23, 2003). 
 108. Botosan & Plumlee, supra note 83.  See SFAS No. 123, para 11.  From 
1995 until the aftermath of Enron and WorldCom, almost without exception, 
companies opted for footnote disclosure over expense recognition.  Id. at 312.  
For a description of the Enron and WorldCom accounting troubles, see infra 
notes 132 and 133, respectively. 
 109. Botosan & Plumlee, supra note 83, at 313. 
 110. Id. at 313.  See SFAS No. 123, para. 30.  SFAS 123 
encourages [companies] to recognize [options’] expense in reported 
net income, but allows them to continue using the intrinsic value 
method prescribed by [Opinion No.] 25 for recognition purposes.  
[Companies] using [Opinion No.] 25 must provide footnote disclosures 
of pro forma net income and earnings per share computed using the 
fair value method. 
Id. at para. 11.  For a summary of SFAS No. 123, see Financial Accounting 
Standards Board Summary of Statement No. 123, at http://www.fasb.org 
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IV. INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING COMMUNITY REACTION 
A. History and Composition of the International Accounting 
Standards Board 
Since the inception of the International Accounting Stan-
dards Committee (“IASC”) in 1973, the international commu-
nity has had its own accounting standard-setting body.111  In the 
early 1990s, the IASC focused much of its attention on internal 
restructuring to create a more comprehensive international 
standard-setting body.  In 1993, an interim group known as 
G4+1 formed in order to continue reviewing accounting issues 
and to set standards for use by the international community 
while the IASC was in the process of restructuring.112  Recently, 
the IASC restructured its membership, revised its constitu-
tion,113 and in 2001, took the form of the International Account-
ing Standards Board (“IASB”),114 at which time, G4+1 dis-
banded.115  The IASB is a London-based, privately-funded, inde-
pendent body, the goal of which is to create a universal, com-
prehensible and enforceable set of accounting standards.116 
  
/st/summary/stsum123.shtml (last visited Sept. 23, 2003).  See Kim, supra 
note 107. 
 111. See IASC Chronology, supra note 11.  The state accountancy agencies 
of Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, the 
United Kingdom, Ireland, and the U.S. formed the IASC.  Id.  Over the next 
twenty-five years, states continued to join the IASC as it created a set of ac-
counting standards to be used universally.  These standards have become 
widely used outside the U.S.  See generally id.  However, the U.S. never 
adopted the IASC standards.  Instead, it continues to follow the GAAP set by 
the FASB. 
 112. G4+1 is an association of the accounting standards-setting bodies of 
each of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.  
IASC Involvement with G4+1 Projects, IAS Plus, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, 
Para. 1, at http://www.iasplus.com/agenda/g4.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2002).  
The IASC contributed to G4+1 projects, in its capacity as an observer.  Id. at 
para. 3.  For a summary of G4+1’s objectives and goals, see G4+1, Financial 
Accounting Standards Board, at http://www.fasb.org /IASC/G4+1.shtml (last 
visited Nov. 7, 2002). 
 113. IASC Chronology, supra note 11, at sub-heading 2000. 
 114. Id. at sub-heading 2001. 
 115. Since the IASB was ready to begin formally, G4+1 agreed to disband at 
its January 30, 2001 meeting.  IASC Involvement with G4+1 Projects, supra 
note 112, at para. 1. 
 116. About Us, Mission Statement, International Accounting Standards 
Bureau, at http://www.iasc.org.uk/cmt/0001.asp?n=57&s=1400100&sc={A29E 
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Before it disbanded, G4+1 reviewed compensatory stock op-
tion disclosure policies and published its findings in Accounting 
for Share-Based Payments (“G4+1 Study”).117  Among other 
things, the study concluded that companies should recognize an 
expense in their financial statements for all transactions for 
goods and services with employees and suppliers in considera-
tion for stock options, “with a corresponding charge to the in-
come statement when those goods or services are consumed.”118  
It also determined that the expense should be calculated using 
the fair value of the option’s underlying stock,119  which should 
be calculated using an option pricing model (such as Black-
Scholes or the binomial method).120  Further, it specified that the 
measurement date should be the vesting date (and not the 
grant date),121 and the vesting date should be the date the option 
becomes unconditionally exercisable.122 
B. IASB Decides to Expense Compensatory Stock Options 
In an effort to hold itself out as a truly independent standard-
setting organization and to slay the toughest dragons first,123 the 
  
CA6C-5273-428A-8D42-DF0E2776131A}&sd=314418309 (last visited Sept. 23, 
2003) [hereinafter IASB Mission Statement].  Among others, the member 
states of the European Union and Australia follow IASB standards.  T.R. 
Reid, Options Must Be Treated as Expenses, Global Panel Says, WASH. POST, 
July 17, 2002, at E4. 
 117. Discussion Paper, G4+1 Position Paper: Accounting for Share-Based 
Payment, International Accounting Standards Committee (2000), available at 
http://www.iasc.org.uk/docs/g4sp00/g4sp00.pdf.  G4+1 Study Share-Based 
Payments (Stock Compensation), IAS Plus, Deloitte Touche Tomatsu, at 
http://www.iasplus.com/agenda/g4share.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2003) 
[hereinafter D&T on G4+1].  Accounting for Share-Based Payments was pub-
lished in 2000.  Id. at sub-heading Published. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at para. 1. 
 120. See supra note 88. 
 121. D&T on G4+1, supra note 117, at paras. 1–2. 
 122. Id. at para 3.  G4+1 made its draft public for commentary and feed-
back.  For a summary of the comment letters submitted by the five major ac-
counting firms, see G4+1 Discussion Paper – “Share-based Payments” Sum-
mary of “Big 5” Comment Letters, at http://www.fei.org/advocacy/download/ 
G41CommentLettermary.pdf#xml=http://fei.org.master.com/texis/master/sear
ch/mysite.txt?q=%22sharebased+compensation%22&order=r&id=70683809c2 
d02f1&cmd=xml (last visited Sept. 23, 2003). 
 123. Rob Urban, International Accounting Board Fighting to Restore Confi-
dence, CALGARY HERALD, June 30, 2002, D9, available at http://www.kellogg. 
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IASB agreed to pick up where G4+1 left off in creating an in-
ternational, definitive set of accounting standards to deal with 
disclosure of compensatory stock options.124  In September 2001, 
the IASB adopted the G4+1 Study, incorporating it into its own 
summary (“IASB Summary”), in which it reviewed the project’s 
history and the findings of G4+1. 125  The IASB Summary made 
preliminary determinations on disclosure requirements for 
stock-based compensation in financial statements,126 which it 
solidified in its exposure draft, released on November 7, 2002 
(“IASB Exposure Draft”).127  As part of its analysis, the IASB 
noted that while few countries had an accounting standard for 
share-based payments, without exception, those countries that 
had considered the issue concluded that compensatory stock 
options should be expensed.128 
  
northwestern.edu/news/hits/020630ch.htm.  Urban notes that some politicians 
and accountants believe that the FASB, “relies too much on specific rules, 
which allow companies to violate the spirit of accounting standards and still 
comply with GAAP.”  Id.  Kimberly Crook of the IASB has stated that the 
although the FASB deems expensing stock options the appropriate disclosure 
method, such disclosure is not compulsory in the U.S., “because the Americans 
have made this a political issue, not an accounting question.”  Reid, supra 
note 116. 
 124. IASB Summary, supra note 13.  The IASB released its exposure draft 
on November 7, 2002.  Projects in Progress, Int’l Accounting Standards Bu-
reau, at sub-heading Timetable, at http://www.iasc.org.uk/cmt/0001.asp?s= 
1506247&sc={A54F497F-149B-4F27-99A3-F0F9CC72CC19}&n=66 (last vis-
ited Sept. 23, 2003). 
 125. See IASB Observer Notes, June 21, 2001, at http://www.iasc.org.uk/ 
docs/acpapers/200206/0206ob05.pdf. 
 126. IASB Summary, supra note 13. 
 127. See IASB Exposure Draft, supra note 12. 
 128. Id. at 1.  As part of its review, the IASB considered each of the G4+1’s 
draft policy entitled “Accounting for Share-Based Payment,” the German Ac-
counting Standards Committee’s draft accounting standard entitled “Account-
ing for Share Option Plans and Similar Compensation Arrangements,” the 
Danish Institute of State Authorized Public Accountants’ Discussion Paper 
entitled “Accounting Treatment of Share-Based Payment,” SFAS 123 and the 
Canadian Accounting Standards Board’s accounting standard entitled “Stock-
based Compensation and Other Stock-based Payments.”  Id. at 1–2.  For a 
summary of each analysis, see id. 
File: EllenMacro3.doc Created on:  10/21/2003 11:06 AM Last Printed: 11/16/2003 9:27 PM 
302 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 29:1 
Therefore, it is not surprising that the IASB, like its prede-
cessors, plans to require companies to recognize compensatory 
stock options as an expense on their financial statements,129 
which will be measured using the fair value of an option’s un-
derlying stock as of the grant date.130  The IASB also proposed 
that all companies, both public and private, be required to cal-
culate the expense of their compensatory stock options using 
the fair value method.131 
  
 129. IASB Exposure Draft, supra note 12, at 19.  IASB Summary, supra 
note 13, at 4.  For a detailed analysis of the IASB Summary, see IASB Techni-
cal Agenda Project Share-Based Payment, IAS Plus, Deloitte Touche Toh-
matsu, at http://www.iasplus.com/agenda/share.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 
2003) [hereinafter Technical Agenda].  The IASB reviewed the disclosure ap-
proach adopted by SFAS 123, but rejected it as an inadequate alternative for 
recognition.  Id. at sub-heading Recognition vs. disclosure. 
 130. IASB Exposure Draft, supra note 12, at 16; IASB Summary, supra note 
13, at 4.  See Technical Agenda, supra note 129, at sub-heading Fundamental 
Decisions.  Before adopting the grant date as the measurement date, the IASB 
considered using each of the grant date, service date (“the date at which the 
employee performs the services necessary to become unconditionally entitled 
to an option”), vesting date and exercise date.  Id. at sub-heading Measure-
ment date.  The IASB also met with Myron Scholes, the Nobel Prize winning 
co-drafter of the Black-Scholes valuation method, after which the IASB agreed 
with Scholes that, “it is possible to reliably estimate [sic] the fair value of 
share options.”  Id. at sub-heading Reliable measurement.  However, the IASB 
does not plan to require companies to use a particular valuation method.  Id. 
at sub-heading Valuation method. 
 131. IASB Exposure Draft, supra note 12, at 16.  Technical Agenda, supra 
note 129, at sub-heading Fundamental Decisions.  By choosing the fair value 
measurement base, the IASB rejected each of the historical cost, intrinsic 
value and minimum value bases.  Id. at sub-heading Measurement bases. 
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C. Reaction to the IASB’s Plan to Require Expensing Stock Op-
tions 
In the wake of corporate accounting scandals like Enron132 
and WorldCom133 that consumed international attention begin-
ning in 2001, and in anticipation of the IASB’s proposed option 
disclosure requirements, public debate again has turned to cor-
porate transparency and the expensing of compensatory stock 
options.  Unlike in the early 1990s, public response appears to 
be more balanced.  While U.S. companies generally continue to 
hold their ground by insisting that an expensing requirement 
would damage corporate financials severely and impact em-
ployee compensation choices, both national and international 
support for the IASB plan has grown.134 
  
 132. Enron, Inc. is a Houston-based energy trading company, which filed for 
bankruptcy protection after disclosing, among other things, that over the last 
five years, it falsely reported its earnings.  Oliver Willis, EnronGate, at 
http://www.oliverwillis.com/enrongate/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2002).  For con-
tinuing updates on the Enron scandal, along with a link to all public docu-
ments filed in connection with the ongoing investigations and suits, see Find-
Law Special Coverage Enron, Findlaw.com, at http://news.findlaw.com/lega 
news/lit/enron/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2003); See Stephanie J. Burke, The Col-
lapse of Enron: A Bibliography of Online Legal, Government and Legislative 
Resources, at http://www.llrx.com/features/enron.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 
2003).  But see Public Comment Letter from the International Employee Stock 
Option Coalition (“IESOC”) to David Tweedie, IASB Chairman (Dec. 31, 2001) 
(in which the IESOC calls for the IASB to adopt the SFAS 123 model), at 
http://www.americanbenefitscouncil.org/issues/other/iesoc_1214.pdf [hereinaf-
ter IESOC Comment Letter].  However, the IESOC is largely comprised of 
U.S. corporations and organizations.  For a complete list of its members, see 
id. 
 133. WorldCom Corp. is a Clinton, Mississippi–based long-distance tele-
communications company that was forced by the SEC to restate downwardly 
its financials.  The SEC filed fraud charges against the company after an in-
ternal audit proved “that almost $4 billion of expenses in 2001 and $797 mil-
lion in the first quarter of 2002 were wrongly listed on company books as capi-
tal expenses, thus not reflected in its earnings results.”  MSNBC News, SEC 
Files Fraud Charges Against WorldCom (June 26, 2002), at http://stacks. 
msnbc.com/news/772330.asp?cp1=1#BODY.  See Jake Ulick, WorldCom’s Fi-
nancial Bomb, CNNMONEY, June 26, 2002, at http://money.cnn.com/2002/06/ 
25/news/ worldcom/. 
 134. AIMR, the Association for Investment Management and Research, is 
an international, non-profit, professional society of fifty-eight thousand in-
vestment professionals, headquartered in Charlottesville, Virginia, with of-
fices in Hong Kong and London.  Analysts Association AIMR Wants FASB to 
Follow IASB Plan to Require Companies to Expense Stock Option Costs, July 
 
File: EllenMacro3.doc Created on:  10/21/2003 11:06 AM Last Printed: 11/16/2003 9:27 PM 
304 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 29:1 
Once again, particularly in the U.S., debate over expensing 
has amplified.  This time, proponents of expensing include the 
notable addition of PricewaterhouseCoopers Chief Executive 
Officer, Samuel DiPiazza, Jr.135  DiPiazza favors the adoption of 
international principles that will “mak[e] financial reporting 
more relevant to investors.”136 
U.S. lawmakers, again, have attempted to legislate a resolu-
tion to stock option expensing.  There has been an onslaught of 
bills submitted to the House and Senate.137  Most notably, Sena-
  
17, 2002, at para. 10, at http://www.aimr.org/pressroom/02releases/02fasb_st 
ockopt.html.  In July 2002, AIMR’s Senior Vice President, Patricia Doran 
Walters, reiterated the organization’s long-held stance that although most 
corporations would prefer to continue under SFAS 123 and its international 
progeny, AIMR strongly affirms its belief that stock options should be ex-
pensed.  Id. at paras. 2–3.  In its September 2001 international survey of fi-
nancial analysts and portfolio managers, AIMR found that among its respon-
dents: (1) 88% agreed that stock option plans are forms of compensation to the 
grantees; (2) 83% agreed that, “the accounting method for employee stock 
options should require recognition of an expense in the income statement;” 
and (3) 81% acknowledged that they consider stock options when appraising a 
company’s performance and establishing its value.  Id. at para. 7.  For a 
breakdown of AIMR’s survey results, see Survey on Accounting for Stock Op-
tions, at http://www.aimr.com/advocacy/02commltr/02sharebsd_c.html (last 
visited Sept. 23, 2003).  But see IESOC Comment Letter, supra note 132, (re-
questing that the IASB adopt SFAS 123 as its disclosure policy).  The IESOC 
is a Washington D.C.–based organization comprised largely of U.S. corpora-
tions and organizations.  For a list of the IESOC’s members see id.  See also 
Corey Rosen, Update for January 7, 2002, sub-heading Opposition to IASB 
Accounting Proposal, IRS Withholding Proposal Grows, The National Center 
for Employee Ownership, at http://www.nceo.org/columns/cr103.html (last 
visited Sept. 23, 2003). 
 135. John S. McLenahen, GAAP Goodbye? PwC’s CEO wants to Scrap 
Rules-based Accounting for Global Guidelines, INDUSTRYWEEK.COM, Aug. 
2002, at 17. 
 136. Id. at 17–18.  DiPiazza’s belief in a global standard in lieu of GAAP, in 
part, stems from the fact that, “the current U.S. GAAP begins with a principle 
but then moves to dozens and dozens of rules and exceptions, all designed to 
appease somebody out there in the market.”  Id. at 18. 
 137. A small sampling of current bills introduced into Congress in 2002 
regarding stock options include: (1) Prevention of Stock Option Abuse Act, 
S. 2822, 107th Cong. (2002); (2) To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 
to clarify the treatment of incentive stock options and employee stock pur-
chase plans, H.R. 2695, 107th Cong. (2001), (which would exclude ISO’s and 
employee stock purchase plans from being considered as wages); (3) Stock 
Option Fairness and Accountability Act, S. 2760, 107th Cong. (2002); 
(4) Workplace Employee Stock Option Act of 2002, H.R. 5242, 107th Cong. 
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tors Levin and McCain, together with Senators Fitzgerald, 
Durbin and Dayton, re-introduced S. 1940 entitled “Ending the 
Double Standards for Stock Options Act,” which initially was 
introduced in 1997, but has gained wide exposure since Febru-
ary 2002.138  Under current U.S. regulations, companies can 
treat stock options as an expense on tax returns, but refrain 
from treating them as an expense on their financial state-
ments.139  If passed, the Act would require companies to treat 
stock options uniformly in both their profit and loss statements 
and their tax returns.140  Thus, if a company claims a tax deduc-
tion for a stock option expense on its tax return, it also must 
disclose the same expense in its financial statement.141  How-
ever, the bill does not require that companies unilaterally ex-
pense stock options or dictate the accounting method by which 
companies must expense their options.142  By tying the com-
pany’s corporate tax deduction directly to the amount expensed 
on the company’s financial statement,143 the bill seeks to achieve 
  
(2002); (5) Rank and File Stock Option Act of 2002, S. 2877, 107th Cong. 
(2002); (6) Stock Option Accounting Reform Act, H.R. 5147, 107th Cong. 
(2002).  To access bills on stock options, see the United States Senate official 
web site, at http://www.senate.gov/index.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2003). 
 138. Ending the Double Standards for Stock Options Act, S. 1940, 107th 
Cong. (2002).  See also Press Release, Senator John McCain of Arizona, 
McCain Cosponsors Ending Double Standards for Stock Options Act (Feb. 13, 
2002), at http://www.mccain.senate.gov/stockops.htm [hereinafter McCain 
Press Release].  In 1993, Levin introduced a similar bill, S. 576 entitled “Cor-
porate Executives Stock Option Accountability Act,” which the Senate rejected 
by an eighty-eight to nine vote.  Senators Levin and McCain Introduce the 
“Ending the Double Standard for Stock Options Act”, The Nat’l Ass’n of Stock 
Plan Professionals, Feb. 15, 2002, at http://www.naspp.com/miscContent/0215 
2002-StockOptionsDoubleStandard.htm, at para. 3 [hereinafter NASP on 
S. 1940]; Alan Reynolds, Stock Options and the Levin-McCain Double Stan-
dard, The Institute for Policy Innovation, Apr. 2, 2002, at http://www.ipi.org; 
Lesli S. Laffie, McCain-Levin Stock Options Bill, THE TAX ADVISOR, Aug. 1997, 
at 472. 
 139. McCain Press Release, supra note 138, at para. 2. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at para. 8. 
 143. Expensing Stock Options – Not an Option, Am. Electronics Ass’n, at 
http://www.aeanet.org/govermnentalaffairs/gaet_stockoptionsbasic.asp (last 
visited Nov. 7, 2002) [hereinafter AeA on S. 1940]. 
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consistent, fair disclosure.144  In April 2002, President Bush im-
plicitly rejected S. 1940 by publicly supporting the continuance 
of FASB 123,145 signaling that he is likely to veto it if passed. 
It is worth noting that the bill’s sponsors framed their argu-
ment in the context of the Enron scandal.146  Both Senators 
Levin and McCain point out that between 1996 and 2000, En-
ron issued close to $600 million in compensatory stock options, 
for which it earned $600 million in tax deductions.147  Levin and 
McCain argue that the crux of the Enron debacle is that the 
company received the benefit of a $600 million tax deduction 
without disclosing the burden of $600 million in lost profits.148  
Had Enron also reported the $600 million as an expense on its 
  
 144. McCain Press Release, supra note 138, at para. 7.  In his press release, 
McCain stated, 
[n]o other type of compensation gets treated as an expense for tax 
purposes, without also being treated as an expense on the company 
books.  This double standard is exactly the kind of inequitable corpo-
rate benefit that makes the American people irate and must be 
eliminated.  If companies do not want to fully disclose [sic] on their 
books how much they are compensating their employees, then they 
should not be able to claim a tax benefit for it. 
Id.  See Press Release, Senator Carl Levin of Michigan, Summary of Levin-
McCain-Fitzgerald-Durbin-Dayton Ending the Double Standard for Stock 
Options Act (Feb. 13, 2002) [hereinafter Levin Press Release].  This year, for-
mer SEC Chairman, Arthur Levitt, stated that one of his great regrets while 
serving as Chairman was failing to require that stock options be treated as an 
expense on corporate financial statements.  NASP on S. 1940, supra note 138, 
at para. 3. 
 145. Levinsohn, supra note 82, at 64.  President Bush stated, “I think once 
options are in the money, they ought to be calculated in the dilution, that they 
ought to be dilutive in their earnings-per-share calculations.”  Id. 
 146. McCain Press Release, supra note 139; Levin Press Release, supra note 
144.  For a description of the Enron scandal, see supra note 132. 
 147. McCain Press Release, supra note 138, at para. 3.  McCain stated, 
[t]he latest scandals involving the collapse of Enron highlight the 
problem of misleading annual statements and financial state-
ments…[C]urrent rules allow companies such as Enron to disclose as 
little as possible.  And this prevents investors, Wall Street analysts, 
corporate executives and auditors from properly understanding the 
bottom line of corporations. 
Id.  Senator Levin, stated in his press release, “The Enron fiasco has brought 
to light a long-festering problem in how some U.S. corporations use stock op-
tions to avoid paying U.S. taxes while overstating earnings.”  Levin Press 
Release, supra note 144, at para. 1. 
 148. See Levin Press Release, supra note 144. 
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financial statements, its reported profits would have been re-
duced by one-third.149  Had Enron’s profit margin been cut by 
one-third, its stock price also would have deflated,150 perhaps 
reflecting a more accurate price per share. 
Reaction to S. 1940 from the high technology business com-
munity largely continues to be negative.  Many technology or-
ganizations have taken an active stand against the bill151 and 
continue to support SFAS 123.152  On the other hand, in light of 
the myriad of recent accounting scandals, and in an effort to 
rebuild investor confidence, major corporations voluntarily have 
begun to expense stock options.153  However, many corporations 
still insist that, currently, no valuation method accurately cap-
tures the cost of stock options.154 
Therefore, the FASB recently agreed to amend SFAS 123 to 
make it easier for companies to adopt expensing methods and to 
  
 149. Id. at para. 1. 
 150. See id. 
 151. The American Electronics Association (“AeA”) actively campaigned 
against S. 1940, and rejects the idea that stock option expensing had anything 
to do with the collapse of Enron.  For a summary of its argument, see AeA on 
S. 1940, supra note 143.  The Information Technology Association of America 
(“ITAA”) also rejects both S. 1940 and the Enron implications made by Levin 
and McCain.  Harris Miller, An Enron ‘Elixir’ Would Try to Cure What Doesn’t 
Ail Us, May 1, 2002, at http://www.itaa.org/news/view/ViewPoint.cfm?ID=22.  
Alan Reynolds, a senior fellow with the Cato Institute (http://www/cato.org) 
also rejects both the bill and the Enron connection.  See Reynolds, supra note 
138. 
 152. AeA on S. 1940, supra note 143, at para. 5.  While opposition to S. 1940 
has intensified in 2002, in 1997 in a letter to the Senate Finance Committee 
Chairman, the AICPA, rejected the bill.  For a summary of AICPA’s objec-
tions, see Laffie, supra note 138. 
 153. Reuven Brenner & Donald Luskin, Another Option on Options, WALL 
ST. J., Sept. 3, 2002, at A20.  A small sample of companies that have chosen to 
recognize stock options as an expense on their financial statements include: 
The CocaCola Company, Ford Motor Co., The Gillette Company, HJ Heinz 
and The Washington Post.  Hughes, supra note 91, at para. 4. 
 154. The Wall Street Journal, in its online list of companies that have cho-
sen to expense, printed this warning: 
Calculations come from the companies’ data and use the Black-
Scholes formula, which links the value of an option to such variables 
as the current share price, the exercise price, expected volatility in 
share prices and expected dividends.  This formula doesn’t give an ac-
curate picture of the cost of stock options. 
Hughes, supra note 91, at sub-heading Not Ideal. 
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provide clearer, more regular disclosure.  On October 4, 2002, 
the FASB released an exposure draft of its proposed amend-
ment to SFAS 123.155  The three-pronged proposed amendment 
would (1) provide three transition methods for companies who 
chose to adopt SFAS 123’s expensing option, (2) require clearer 
disclosure of the accounting methods used, and (3) require addi-
tional disclosures in each company’s interim financial state-
ments.156  Currently, disclosure is required only in annual finan-
cial statements.157 
V. TOWARDS AN EFFECTIVE DISCLOSURE STANDARD 
A. Regulatory Issue v. Political Issue 
The method of disclosure of option expense on financial 
statements should be determined based on standards that pro-
mote and protect accuracy and clarity, since the point of such 
disclosure is to provide the investing public with sufficient in-
formation to make well-informed investment decisions.158  In the 
U.S., the FASB has promulgated the GAAP since the SEC 
charged it with this task in 1973.159  Congress, by threatening to 
legislate around the FASB’s proposed amendments to the 
GAAP, turned this regulatory issue into a political one.160  Legis-
lators who sided with the business community, like Senator Jo-
seph Lieberman, effectively thwarted useful accounting re-
form.161  In so doing, Congress exacerbated the growing option 
disclosure problem.  Since that time, the stock market over-
inflated, and legislators, through their politically-motivated de-
cisions on accounting reform, created an environment in which 
accounting disasters like Enron and WorldCom were possible. 
  
 155. Accounting for Stock Based Compensation – Transition and Disclosure, 
an amendment of SFAS 123, FASB Exposure Draft, at ii, at http://www.fasb 
.org/draft/ed_amend_st123.pdf [hereinafter FASB Exposure Draft]; FASB 
News Release, FASB Issues Exposure Draft on Accounting for Stock Options, 
Amends Transition and Disclosure Provisions, Oct. 4, 2002, at http://www.fa 
sb.org/news/nr100402.shtml. 
 156. FASB Exposure Draft, supra note 155, at ii. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Rouse & Barton, supra note 6, at 68. 
 159. See Financial Accounting Standards, supra note 3. 
 160. Hinchman, supra note 96.  See Lieberman Legislation, supra note 9, at 
15. 
 161. See generally id. 
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Ironically, in an attempt to preserve its regulatory role, the 
FASB chose to abandon this important regulatory reform.  
However, in so doing, it succumbed to the will of Congress, and 
lost its political independence.162  By their very nature, account-
ing standards should be relatively static, changing only to clar-
ify disclosure for investors.  As business trends change, account-
ing standards also should be modified to reflect such change.  
This is precisely what the FASB intended when it adopted the 
FASB Exposure Draft.163  The fact that Congress was willing to 
overrule the FASB to placate business interest groups shows 
that the U.S. accounting body has lost its power.  That the 
FASB yielded to pressure from Congress is evidence that it is 
not an independent body.164  In order to provide and ensure ac-
curate disclosure for the investing public, disclosure standards 
must be purely regulatory, safe from the influence of political 
pressure.  An argument can be made that if the U.S. adopts an 
international standard, it will cede authority over its own sys-
tem.  However, as both the corporate community and the invest-
ing public become more global in scope, the U.S. accounting sys-
tem must as well. 
B. National v. International Standard 
Since the business community has become increasingly 
global, with foreign companies registered on U.S. exchanges 
and vice versa and foreign investors investing in global mar-
kets, the need for a universal set of accounting standards has 
increased.  But because stock option disclosure rules vary from 
country to country, it has become impossible for investors to 
compare corporate balance sheets and determine profit mar-
gins.  Although investors should be able to compare financial 
statements on a line-by-line basis to evaluate their investment, 
in reality, they are comparing apples and oranges because they 
are looking at numbers derived from different accounting meth-
ods. 
To alleviate this confusion, the global accounting community 
should adopt one set of standards, which all countries should 
agree to follow.  The IASB was created by the international 
  
 162. See Reid, supra note 116. 
 163. See IASB Exposure Draft, supra note 12. 
 164. See generally id. 
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community to accomplish this goal.165  Finalizing and adopting 
the IASB Exposure Draft is a step in the right direction. 
C. Fair Value v. Intrinsic Value & Pricing Models 
As the FASB understood when it prepared the FASB Expo-
sure Draft, Opinion No. 25’s policy of using an option’s intrinsic 
value to determine its expense provides a strong incentive for 
companies to issue at the money, fixed stock options, which 
have no compensation cost under GAAP.166  By avoiding this 
expense on their financial statements, companies give away 
something of value for free.167  While an at the money grant ar-
guably can be deemed cost-free to the issuer as of the grant 
date, because it accrues value before it is exercised, it also has 
value on the grant date.168 
When Opinion No. 25 was drafted, it provided an important 
incentive to businesses, enabling them to recruit and retain 
qualified personnel, and to adopt broad-based plans under 
which options are granted to all of its employees, and not just 
its executives.169  However, through the successful implementa-
tion of Opinion No. 25, coupled with its inadvertent tax break, it 
provides for fixed, at the money grants.170  Such options have 
become a substantial percentage of corporate compensation and 
now have a significant effect on the corporate balance sheet.171 
Proponents of the intrinsic value method argue that deter-
mining an option’s fair value is too difficult to accomplish and 
too inaccurate to be relied on,172 when in fact, neither is the case.  
Both the Black-Scholes and the binomial pricing models provide 
accountants with manageable formulas to ascertain the option’s 
fair value.173  Moreover, while it is true that an option’s fair 
value necessarily is an estimated value,174 fair value provides a 
  
 165. See IASB Mission Statement, supra note 116. 
 166. Ernst & Young Summary, supra note 58, at para. 20. 
 167. See id. at para. 13. 
 168. See id. 
 169. Johnson, supra note 14, at 148–49. 
 170. Rouse & Barton, supra note 6, at 68; See Ernst & Young Summary, 
supra note 58, at para. 13. 
 171. See Ellis, supra note 4, at 412–13. 
 172. Rouse & Barton, supra note 6, at 69. 
 173. See D&T on G4+1, supra note 117, at paras. 1–2. 
 174. Wiedman & Goldberg, supra note 50, at 6. 
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considerably more accurate valuation of an option’s cost to the 
company than the intrinsic value method,175 which typically 
provides no expense charge.  Adoption of the intrinsic value 
method discourages companies from granting performance-
based options that are better tailored to an individual em-
ployee’s accomplishments,176 and significantly inflates corporate 
profits on financial statements.177  In order to provide accurate 
disclosure of profits and expenses on the financial statement, 
intrinsic value should be discarded in determining an option’s 
expense to the issuing corporation.  Rather, the fair value 
method should be used, employing either the Black-Scholes or 
the binomial pricing models.178  The IASB wisely adopted the 
fair value approach because it more accurately reflects the true 
value of the compensatory stock option’s cost to the company. 
While the IASB Exposure Draft provides a clearer, more 
manageable valuation method, it also should pick one pricing 
model to determine fair value, like the Black-Scholes pricing 
model or the binomial model.  Although both standards calcu-
late an option’s fair value,179 when companies use different mod-
els, investors cannot compare financial option expense accu-
rately because each model provides a slightly different end re-
sult.  Given the primary importance of consistency and accu-
racy, one standard should be applied, and the choice of standard 
should be taken away from companies. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
When the Accounting Principles Board drafted Opinion No. 
25 in 1973, it was a rational accounting rule that encouraged 
companies, which traditionally granted compensatory stock op-
tions only to senior executives, to share the wealth with all of 
their employees,180 and provided small companies with an incen-
tive tool to attract qualified executives whom they otherwise 
could not afford to hire.181  However, as compensatory stock op-
  
 175. D&T on G4+1, supra note 117, at para. 1. 
 176. See Accounting Changes, supra note 62, at 72. 
 177. See Colvin, supra note 91, at 75. 
 178. D&T on G4+1, supra note 117, at paras. 1–2. 
 179. See id. 
 180. Johnson, supra note 14, at 149–50. 
 181. Id. at 149. 
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tions became widely used and had a greater impact on the profit 
margins in financial statements,182 accounting standard regula-
tors should have revised the rules so that financial statements 
would have continued to reflect corporate operating expenses 
accurately.  When the FASB attempted to effect this need to 
provide clear disclosure on corporate balance sheets, and pro-
vide transparency for investors, it was shut down by both the 
business community and by the U.S. Congress.183  However, it is 
clear that neither the disclosure exemption adopted by Opinion 
No. 25, nor the voluntary disclosure policy set forth in SFAS 
123 is sufficient to provide investors with the transparency they 
require and deserve when making investment decisions.184  As it 
stands, the U.S. disclosure standard, even with the FASB’s pro-
posed amendments, deprives investors of adequate disclosure 
necessary to evaluate the relative attractiveness of their in-
vestments.185 
On the other hand, the IASB, not beholden to any particular 
interest group, nor under the sole influence of any one political 
regime, has created a new standard, which comports with the 
internationally-recognized belief that stock options must be ex-
pensed in a manner that accurately reflects their true cost to 
companies. 186  The IASB Exposure Draft is a better standard 
than SFAS 123 because it properly treats compensatory stock 
options as an expense, and because the IASB is truly independ-
ent and international.  Thus, the IASB is in a better position to 
promulgate unbiased accounting regulations.  Once finalized, 
the FASB should adopt it in lieu of SFAS 123. 
 
Ellen J. Grossman* 
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 186. See Survey on Accounting for Stock Options, supra note 134. 
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